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INTRODUCTION
Nearly 60 years ago, Larry Boynton worked at the Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC
(“KUC”) smelter where he was allegedly exposed to asbestos-containing products and, as
a result, carried asbestos fibers home on his work clothing. His wife, Barbara Boynton,
was then allegedly exposed to those fibers while laundering that clothing. 1 This type of
exposure is known as “take-home exposure” or “non-occupational exposure.” Mrs.
Boynton was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma on February 4, 2016 and died on
February 27, 2016. This appeal considers whether a premises owner, like KUC, owes a
duty in a take-home asbestos exposure case to a family member who never set foot on its
premises.
Mr. Boynton filed suit against KUC, PacifiCorp, and Phillips 66/ConocoPhillips
(“Conoco”) (collectively the “Premises Defendants”) alleging claims of strict premises
liability and negligence. The allegations against the Premises Defendants are identical
and consist of failures to act, or nonfeasance. Mr. Boynton alleges that Mrs. Boynton
was exposed to asbestos because the Premises Defendants failed to prevent Mr. Boynton
from carrying asbestos fibers home on his clothing and failed to warn him of the potential
hazards of asbestos exposure. The Premises Defendants moved for summary judgment
arguing that they did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton. Judge Randall Skanchy denied
KUC’s motion, finding a disputed issue of material fact (without identifying the disputed
fact), and granted the very similar motions of PacifiCorp and Conoco.
1

For purposes of this appeal only, KUC assumes Mr. and Mrs. Boynton were exposed to
asbestos because whether or not they were actually exposed is irrelevant to whether KUC
owed Mrs. Boynton a duty.
1

The district court’s denial of KUC’s motion for summary judgment should be
reversed because KUC did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton. Whether a duty exists is a
question of law, not a question of fact. In B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, this Court listed five
factors relevant to determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff:
(1) whether the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct consists of an
affirmative act or merely an omission; (2) the legal relationship of the
parties; (3) the foreseeability or likelihood of injury; (4) public policy as to
which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury; and (5) other
general policy considerations.
2012 UT 11, ¶ 5, 275 P.3d 228 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The first two
factors are “plus” factors because they create a duty while the last three factors are
“minus” factors because they eliminate a duty that would otherwise exist. Id.
KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of nonfeasance. When a claim is
based on a defendant’s nonfeasance, as is the case here, a duty does not exist without a
special relationship. KUC therefore does not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton because it is
undisputed there is no legal relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton.
Even if KUC engaged in misfeasance, the three “minus” factors would eliminate
any duty created by that misfeasance. First, harm from take-home asbestos exposure was
not reasonably foreseeable to KUC when Mr. Boynton worked at the smelter (1961–66).
Although the danger of very high direct occupational asbestos exposure, such as in
asbestos mining and asbestos textile milling and manufacturing, may have been generally
foreseeable during this time period, the potential harm of take-home exposure was not.
Indeed, there was no real consensus about the risk of exposure to family members until
1972 at the very earliest, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
2

(“OSHA”) first addressed take-home asbestos exposure. 2 As a result, multiple courts
have held that harm from take-home exposure was not reasonably foreseeable prior to the
enactment of those OSHA regulations. 3
Second, KUC was not best situated to prevent harm from take-home exposure
because Mr. Boynton was the one who actually carried the fibers home on his clothing.
Third, public policy disfavors imposing a duty in take-home exposure cases. If the
Court finds that KUC owed a duty to Mrs. Boynton, KUC would arguably owe a duty to
any other person with whom Mr. Boynton’s clothes came into contact because there is no
principled basis for distinguishing such claims. Take-home exposure liability creates
limitless liability for premises owners and virtually an infinite number of potential
plaintiffs.

2

Georgia Pac., LLC v. Farrar, 69 A.3d 1028, 1037 (Md. 2013) (“In addition to setting a
maximum level of airborne asbestos fibers to which workers could be exposed during an
8-hour period, the [1972] regulations require, among other things, that employers (1)
provide and require the use of special protective clothing, including head covering,
gloves, and foot coverings for employees exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos
fibers that exceed the maximum allowed level; (2) provide change rooms and lockers for
employees, so they may change from their work clothes into street clothes; and (3)
provide for the laundering of asbestos-contaminated clothing in a safe manner.”) (citation
omitted).

3

See, e.g., Martin v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2007 WL 2682064, *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2007)
(“Simply put, the literature at the time did not place [the defendant] on notice that
bystanders/nonworkers such as Plaintiff’s Decedent were subject to health maladies due
to second-hand exposure to asbestos-containing materials.”), aff’d, Martin v. Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 2009) (“We agree with the district court
that [the plaintiff] has failed to show the risk was foreseeable at the relevant times.”);
Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Texas, 740 N.W.2d 206,
218 (Mich. 2007) (“Therefore, the risk of “take home” asbestos exposure was, in all
likelihood, not foreseeable by defendant while [the worker] was working at defendant’s
premises from 1954 to 1965.”).
3

The existence of a duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases is a matter of first
impression for Utah appellate courts, but courts across the country have held there is no
duty in such cases. 4 This Court should follow those jurisdictions, hold that KUC did not
owe Mrs. Boynton a duty, and reverse the district court.
4

Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. App. 2007) (“[T]he danger of nonoccupational exposure to asbestos dust on workers’ clothes was neither known nor
reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant] in the 1950s.”); Bootenhoff v. Hormel Foods
Corp., 2014 WL 3744011, *14 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2014) (“[L]ack of foreseeability and
additional policy considerations dictate that [the defendant] did not owe a duty of care to
Norma Bootenhoff.”); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005)
(“[W]e decline to extend on the basis of foreseeability the employer’s duty beyond the
workplace to encompass all who might come into contact with an employee or an
employee’s clothing outside the workplace.”); Farrar, 69 A.3d at 1039 (“[W]e conclude
that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding a duty on the part of [the defendant] to
warn Ms. Farrar, back in 1968–69, of the danger of exposure to the dust on her
grandfather’s clothes.”); Gillen v. Boeing Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(“[T]he Court concludes that [the defendant] owed no duty to Mrs. Gillen regarding her
claim for ‘take-home exposure’ to asbestos.”); Fourteenth Dist., 740 N.W.2d at 222
(“[W]e hold that, under Michigan law, defendant, as owner of the property on which
asbestos-containing products were located, did not owe to the deceased, who was never
on or near that property, a legal duty to protect her from exposure to any asbestos fibers
carried home on the clothing of a member of her household who was working on that
property as the employee of independent contractors, where there was no further
relationship between defendant and the deceased.”); In re Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL
4571196, *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007) (“[T]he Court concludes that [the defendant]
owed no duty to Mrs. Riedel to prevent her from being exposed to asbestos within her
own home.”), aff'd sub nom. Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009); In re
Asbestos Litig., 2012 WL 1413887, *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2012) (“[T]he court finds
under Pennsylvania law an employer/premises owner does not owe a duty to the spouse
of an employee in the take home asbestos exposure context.”); In re New York City
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 116 (N.Y. 2005) (concluding there is “no duty of care”
in take-home exposure cases); Martin, 2007 WL 2682064 at *5 (“[B]ecause it was not
generally foreseeable to either [defendant] during the relevant time period herein that
intermittent, non-occupational exposure to asbestos could put those person[s] at risk of
contracting serious illness, no duty existed.”), aff’d, Martin, 561 F.3d at 445; Van Fossen
v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 2009) (“[T]he district court
correctly concluded [defendants] owed no duty to Ann, a household member of an
independent contractor’s employee.”).
4

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue: Inasmuch as the issue of duty is a legal question, did the district court err in
denying KUC’s motion for summary judgment and concluding there was a disputed issue
of material fact as to whether KUC owed a duty of care to Mrs. Boynton?
Standard of Review: A district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the district court. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008
UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (“An appellate court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness . . . .”) (quotation marks
and citation omitted); Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, ¶ 10, 221 P.3d 219 (“We
review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, giving no
deference to the district court.”).
Preservation: KUC preserved this issue for appeal by filing a motion for
summary judgment seeking a ruling that KUC does not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton. (R.
04162–80.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Mr. Boynton’s work at KUC’s premises

Mr. Boynton married Mrs. Boynton in September 1962. (R. 04165, 05008.) After
their marriage, Mr. Boynton worked as a laborer at KUC’s smelter and continued in that
position for “[p]robably 12 to 15 months” (from 1962 to late 1963 or early 1964). (R.
04165.) Mr. Boynton claims he was exposed to asbestos as a laborer by working in the
vicinity of workers who removed and installed pipe insulation and for approximately a
5

five-month period while cleaning up pipe insulation. (R. 04165–66.) He then worked as
an apprentice and journeyman electrician for Wasatch Electric at KUC’s smelter from
1964 to 1966. (R. 04165, 04242.) In that capacity, he was responsible for “[r]unning
pipe, conduit, pulling wire, terminating, [and] heat trace” on “newer construction and
remodel, upgrades . . . plant-wide, around the converter aisle and places like that.” (R.
04197, 04242, 05241.) He believes he was exposed to asbestos from the installation of
the insulation on pipes and dry asbestos mix that was used by pipe fitters who worked 2
to 20 feet away from him. (R. 04166.) Mrs. Boynton never visited KUC’s premises. (R.
04166, 05008.)
There is no evidence whatsoever that KUC had knowledge of any potential danger
from take-home asbestos exposure.
B.

Mr. Boynton’s work at PacifiCorp and Conoco’s premises

Mr. Boynton was employed as an electrician for (1) Jelco Electric and worked at
PacifiCorp’s Huntington Plant for 5 to 6 months in 1973; and (2) L.E. Myers Electric and
worked at the Conoco refinery off and on from 1976–78. (R. 02237, 02393, 02359.)
Similar to his work for Wasatch Electric at KUC’s smelter, his duties at PacifiCorp and
Conoco involved “[r]unning conduit, pulling wire, cable tray, [and] heat tracing pipes.”
(R. 02685–86, 02393.) At PacifiCorp, he was allegedly exposed to asbestos while
working within 5 to 20 feet of insulators who were sawing and installing pipe insulation
as well as insulation on boilers and turbines. (R. 02256–57.) He made the same
allegations about his time at Conoco and added that the insulators removed the old
asbestos pipe insulation and let it fall to the ground close to where he was working. (Id.)
6

C.

Mr. Boynton’s allegations against KUC, PacifiCorp, and Conoco

Mr. Boynton alleges that Mrs. Boynton died from mesothelioma that she
contracted from laundering his work clothing. (R. 04165.) Mr. Boynton brought strict
premises liability and negligence claims against the Premises Defendants. The
allegations of wrongdoing against the Premises Defendants are identical and include the
following:
Premises Defendants negligently, recklessly, willfully and/or because of
gross and wanton negligence, fault, or strict liability, failed to properly
discharge its duties to Plaintiff in the following particulars: (a) failure to
provide Plaintiff’s husband with a safe place to work; (b) failure to provide
Plaintiff’s husband with adequate engineering or industrial hygiene
measures to control the level of exposure to asbestos, including but not
limited to local exhaust, general ventilation, respiratory protection,
segregation of work involving asbestos, use of wet methods to reduce the
release of asbestos into the ambient air, medical monitoring, air monitoring,
and procedures to prevent the transportation of asbestos fibers home on
Petitioner’s father’s clothing; and (c) failure to inform or warn Plaintiff’s
husband of the hazards of asbestos exposure. . . .
Premises Defendants negligently, recklessly, willfully and/or because of
gross and wanton negligence or fault, failed to properly discharge their
duties to the Plaintiff in the following: (a) failed to provide the Decedent’s
husband with a safe work environment; (b) failed to provide the Decedent’s
husband with safety equipment; (c) failed to provide the Decedent’s
husband with correct, adequate, or proper safety equipment; (d) recklessly
and negligently failed to disclose, warn or reveal critical medical and safety
information regarding asbestos hazards in general and with regard to those
specific hazards at the work site; (e) recklessly concealed and negligently
omitted to reveal critically medical and safety information regarding the
safety and health risks associated with the asbestos and asbestos-containing
products at the worksites; (f) failed to timely remove asbestos hazards from
the work place; (g) failed to properly supervise or monitor the work areas
for compliance with safety regulations; (h) failed to provide a safe and
suitable means of eliminating the amount of asbestos dust in the air; and (i)
failed to provide the necessary facilities, practices and procedures that
would lessen or eliminate the transfer of asbestos from the workplace to the
home on the clothing and/or person of Larry Boynton.
7

(R. 04432–35 (emphasis added).)
In his district court briefing, Mr. Boynton pointed to paragraph 13 from the
Amended Complaint in arguing that the Premises Defendants engaged in
affirmative acts of negligence (misfeasance):
Mrs. Boynton was exposed to asbestos through her husband’s work with
and around asbestos-containing products while working at locations
including, but not limited to the following: [listing KUC, PacifiCorp, and
Conoco locations]. The activities of cutting, chipping, mixing, sanding,
sawing, scraping and sweeping that occurred in association with the work
performed by Mr. Boynton and other workers working around Mr. Boynton
with asbestos-containing products exposed him to great quantities of
asbestos. These asbestos exposures continued as asbestos-containing dust
accumulated on his work clothes and was transported to his cars and home
exposing his wife, Barbara Boynton, to great quantities of asbestos as she
too came in contact with the asbestos-containing products carried home on
those clothes and deposited into her home and cars.
(R. 04419.) But Mr. Boynton does not allege the Premises Defendants were
negligent in doing these acts. In other words, he does not allege the Premises
Defendants were negligent in cutting, chipping, mixing, sanding, sawing, scraping,
and sweeping asbestos-containing products.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Mr. Boynton filed his Amended Complaint on March 23, 2018. (R. 01258.)

Conoco moved for summary judgment on October 22, 2018; PacifiCorp moved for
summary judgment on October 26, 2018; and KUC moved for summary judgment on
November 21, 2018. (R. 02246, 03380, 04180.) The district court held a hearing on all
of the motions on January 25, 2019. (R. 05162.) Then on March 13, 2019, the district
court issued an order denying KUC’s motion for summary judgment and granting
8

Conoco and PacifiCorp’s motions for summary judgment. (R. 05447.) In denying
KUC’s motion, the district court determined there was “a disputed issue of material fact
as to whether a legal duty extends to Mrs. Boynton.” (Id.) In granting the very similar
motions of Conoco and PacifiCorp, the district court determined Conoco and PacifiCorp
did not engage in any misfeasance that would create a duty to Mrs. Boynton, and that
even if they did, each of the Jeffs “minus” factors weighed in favor of no duty. (R.
05443–47.) The district court did not address any of the “minus” factors with respect to
KUC’s motion and did not identify the supposed dispute of material fact that precluded
summary judgment. (R. 05447.) KUC appeals that order.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Whether a duty exists is a question of law and should be articulated in relatively
clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases. Jeffs,
2012 UT 11, ¶ 23. As a matter of law, KUC did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton who
was never at or near KUC’s premises. KUC’s allegedly tortious conduct consists only of
nonfeasance, and no duty exists in cases of nonfeasance absent a special relationship,
which here there undisputedly is not. But even if KUC engaged in misfeasance, KUC did
not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton because harm from take-home asbestos exposure was not
reasonably foreseeable before 1972, KUC was not best positioned to prevent harm from
take-home exposure, and public policy weighs heavily against take-home exposure
liability. The Court should therefore reverse the district court’s decision and hold that
KUC did not owe Mrs. Boynton a duty.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

DUTY IS A QUESTION OF LAW AND SHOULD BE ARTICULATED IN
RELATIVELY CLEAR, CATEGORICAL, BRIGHT-LINE RULES OF
LAW APPLICABLE TO A GENERAL CLASS OF CASES.
“[D]uty is one of four essential elements of a cause of action in tort” and is “an

obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular
standard of conduct toward another.” Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 5 (citations omitted). “Duty
must be determined as a matter of law and on a categorical basis for a given class of tort
claims” and “should be articulated in relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law
applicable to a general class of cases.” Id. at ¶ 23 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). The “general class of cases” here is take-home asbestos exposure claims
against premises owners, which are end users of asbestos-containing products.
II.

KUC DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO MRS. BOYNTON BECAUSE KUC’S
ALLEGED TORTIOUS CONDUCT CONSISTS ONLY OF
NONFEASANCE AND THERE IS NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN KUC AND MRS. BOYNTON.
The five Jeffs factors relevant to determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a

plaintiff are:
(1) whether the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct consists of an
affirmative act or merely an omission; (2) the legal relationship of the
parties; (3) the foreseeability or likelihood of injury; (4) public policy as to
which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury; and (5) other
general policy considerations.
Id. at ¶ 5 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Absent a special relationship,
misfeasance is required for a duty to exist; conversely, a special relationship is typically
required if the case involves only nonfeasance. Id. at ¶ 7. It is undisputed that KUC and

10

Mrs. Boynton are “legal strangers” for negligence purposes, so, without misfeasance,
KUC owed no duty to Mrs. Boynton.
A.

KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of nonfeasance.

“The long-recognized distinction between acts and omissions—or misfeasance and
nonfeasance—makes a critical difference and is perhaps the most fundamental factor
courts consider when evaluating duty.” Id. “Acts of misfeasance, or active misconduct
working positive injury to others, typically carry a duty of care.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Nonfeasance—passive inaction, a failure to take positive steps to
benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the
defendant—by contrast, generally implicates a duty only in cases of special legal
relationships.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The following two cases
illustrate that KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of nonfeasance, not
misfeasance.
In Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., a child’s parents sued a provider of
services to individuals with mental and physical disabilities after the provider’s employee
sexually assaulted the child in a residential facility. 2015 UT 28, ¶¶ 3–9, 345 P.3d 619.
Arguing that the facility owed a duty to the child because of the facility’s misfeasance,
the plaintiffs pointed to the following allegations—“enticing children like [the victim]
into [the residence] by keeping the door open, maintaining a portable swimming pool
outside, and offering candy and television inside.” Id. at ¶ 26. But this was not
misfeasance for purposes of duty analysis because the “crux” of the plaintiffs’ cases was
not that the facility “was uncareful in the way it placed the portable swimming pool, or in
11

the manner in which it offered candy or television programming.” Id. at ¶ 27. The
plaintiffs’ “core complaint” was instead that the facility’s nonfeasance—“in not
performing an employment background check on [the assaulting employee], and in not
providing training and supervision for [the employees]”—caused the child’s harm. Id.
(emphasis in original). The facility’s “affirmative acts [were] a basis for imposing a duty
in the performance of those acts, not for a broader duty to undertake additional measures
aimed at preventing the sexual assault by a third party.” Id. at ¶ 29 (emphasis in
original). Even though the facility had undertaken affirmative acts and even though the
acts were “plausibly connected to the assault,” there was no duty based on the affirmative
acts because plaintiffs’ claims were “aimed at [the facility’s] failures (as regards training,
supervision, and employment background checks), and not its affirmative acts.” Id. at ¶¶
26–29. 5
In this case, Mr. Boynton points to KUC’s supposed misfeasance of selecting
asbestos-containing materials and chipping, sawing, and cutting asbestos-containing
materials in arguing that KUC owed a duty to Mrs. Boynton. But similar to Graves, the
“crux” of this case is not that KUC “was uncareful in the way it [selected asbestoscontaining materials] or in the manner in which it [chipped, sawed, or cut asbestoscontaining materials].” Id. at ¶ 27. Instead, Mr. Boynton’s “core complaint” is that Mrs.
Boynton developed mesothelioma because KUC failed to prevent Mr. Boynton from
carrying asbestos fibers home on his clothing and to warn him of the potential hazards of
5

This Court ultimately found that there was a special relationship justifying the creation
of a duty. Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 36.
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asbestos exposure. KUC’s alleged affirmative acts of selecting asbestos-containing
materials and chipping, sawing, and cutting those materials “are a basis for imposing a
duty in the performance of those acts, not for a broader duty to undertake additional
measures aimed at preventing [take-home asbestos exposure].” Id. at ¶ 29. Like Graves,
Mr. Boynton’s claims are “aimed at [KUC’s] failures . . . and not its affirmative acts.”
Id.
This Court’s opinion in Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. further illustrates
that KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of misfeasance. 2013 UT 60, ¶¶ 38–
41, 321 P.3d 1054. In Hill, the issue was whether a lawn mowing company owed a duty
to apartment residents to prevent hazards associated with tree roots growing hidden in the
grass. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff argued there was a duty because the defendant had voluntarily
undertaken the affirmative act of mowing the lawn. Id. at ¶ 38. But the plaintiff “fail[ed]
to connect up any activity that [the lawn mowing company] voluntarily undertook with
an allegation of negligence in the performance of that activity.” Id. at ¶ 39 (emphasis in
original). The plaintiff’s real claim was “that her injury could have been prevented if
[defendant] had chosen to undertake additional activities” related to the tree roots
growing hidden in the grass. Id. at ¶ 41 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the
defendant’s duty “was limited to the extent of its undertaking—a duty that is narrowly
construed, and not a basis for a general obligation to undertake affirmative acts in aid of
third parties.” Id.
Like Hill, Mr. Boynton has “fail[ed] to connect up any activity that [KUC]
voluntarily undertook with an allegation of negligence in the performance of that
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activity.” Id. at ¶ 39 (emphasis in original). There are no allegations of negligence
related to the selection of asbestos-containing materials or the chipping, sawing, or
cutting of those materials. Instead, Mr. Boynton’s alleged actions of negligence against
KUC concern failures only, not active misconduct. Mr. Boynton claims KUC failed to
provide the necessary facilities, practices, and procedures that would lessen or eliminate
the transfer of asbestos from the workplace to the home on the clothing and/or person of
Mr. Boynton. Indeed, Mr. Boynton’s real claim is that Mrs. Boynton’s harm from
asbestos exposure “could have been prevented if [KUC] had chosen to undertake
additional activities” to prevent Mr. Boynton from carrying asbestos fibers home on his
clothing. Id. at ¶ 41 (emphasis in original).
This is clearly a case of alleged omissions. The premise of Mr. Boynton’s case
against KUC is for its failures, not any acts of affirmative misconduct or misfeasance.
Accordingly, KUC only owed Mrs. Boynton a duty if there was a special relationship
between them.
B.

There is no special relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton.

Nonfeasance “generally implicates a duty only in cases of special relationships.”
Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 7. “The essence of a special relationship is dependence by one party
upon the other or mutual dependence between the parties.” Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726
P.2d 413, 415–16 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). Traditional examples include “common
carrier to its passenger, innkeeper and guest, landowner and invitees to his land, and one
who takes custody of another.” Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 8 (citation omitted). Mrs. Boynton
was not employed by KUC, and she never even stepped foot on its premises. As a result,
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there is no dispute that KUC and Mrs. Boynton are “legal strangers” for negligence
purposes. See Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 538 (“Mrs. Gillen’s relationship with [the
defendant] as it relates to her take-home exposure claim is essentially that of ‘legal
strangers’ under the law of negligence.”). Since there are no allegations of misfeasance
and since there is no special relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton, KUC did not
owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton as a matter of law.
III.

THE THREE MINUS FACTORS, PARTICULARLY FORESEEABILITY,
WOULD ELIMINATE ANY DUTY CREATED BY MISFEASANCE.
The final three Jeffs factors are “minus” factors because they “eliminate a duty

that would otherwise exist.” 2012 UT 11, ¶ 5. This means that even if KUC’s alleged
tortious conduct includes misfeasance, the following factors eliminate any duty arising
from that misfeasance.
A.

Harm from take-home asbestos exposure was not reasonably
foreseeable before the 1972 OSHA Regulations.

Foreseeability analysis for duty “is distinct from that for breach or proximate
cause.” Mower v. Baird, 2018 UT 29, ¶ 24, 422 P.3d 837. It “does not question the
specifics of the alleged tortious conduct such as the specific mechanism of the harm;”
instead, it “relates to the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the
victim and the general foreseeability of harm.” Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 25 (quotation marks
and citations omitted). “The appropriate foreseeability question for duty analysis is
whether a category of cases includes individual cases in which the likelihood of some
type of harm is sufficiently high that a reasonable person could anticipate a general risk
of injury to others.” Id. at ¶ 27. For this appeal, the relevant foreseeability question is
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whether harm from take-home asbestos exposure was foreseeable to a premises owner,
which was an end user of asbestos-containing products, where the exposure occurred
prior to the 1972 OSHA regulations.
When considering foreseeability, it is important not to be swayed by hindsight bias
because “[i]t can be said, with the benefit of hindsight, that everything is foreseeable.”
Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2012). To make the
determination what the defendant should have known in a take-home exposure case, a
court should consider “what information about the nature of asbestos was known at the
time of plaintiff’s alleged exposure” and “what information defendant could reasonable
be held accountable for knowing.” Id. at 1099. Indeed, “the Court must look to whether
the harm to [plaintiff] was foreseeable in the first instance” because “with the benefit of
hindsight, an argument can be made that it was foreseeable that those exposed to asbestos
on Defendant’s premises would later expose those they came in contact with at home.”
Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 539. The relevant timeframe for this appeal is 1961–66 (when
Mr. Boynton undisputedly worked at KUC’s smelter), several years before the
promulgation of the 1972 OSHA regulations. Although the potential danger to workers
from direct, and very high, occupational exposure settings— such as asbestos mining and
asbestos textile milling and manufacturing —was generally foreseeable in the 1960s,
harm from non-occupational asbestos exposure was not reasonably foreseeable until
1972, at the very earliest.
There was very little, if any, information available about the danger of take-home
asbestos exposure when Mr. Boynton worked at KUC’s smelter, and there is no evidence
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KUC had any knowledge of such danger. Speculation that asbestos-related diseases
might result from take-home exposure was first raised in asbestos scientific literature in
1965 (the “Newhouse Study”). 6 But the Newhouse Study was conducted in London and
was not capable of focusing solely on take-home exposure because the studied population
had significant community environmental exposure from a crocidolite asbestos factory in
the neighborhood. Other courts have recognized the Newhouse Study and still
determined that no duty existed for take-home exposure. 7 This one study, with
questionable relevance to take-home exposure and published at the very end of Mr.
Boynton’s time at KUC’s smelter, simply does not make take-home exposure reasonably
foreseeable to an end user of asbestos products on the other side of the globe, like KUC.
Instead, the very earliest that harm from take-home exposure could be reasonably
foreseeable is 1972, when the OSHA regulations were released, which approach has been
followed by multiple courts across the country: Martin, 2007 WL 2682064 at *5, aff’d,
Martin, 561 F.3d at 445; Fourteenth District, 740 N.W.2d at 218; Farrar, 69 A.3d at
1036–39.
6

The Newhouse Study was cited in Dr. Richard Lemen’s affidavit, filed by Plaintiff in
opposition to the Premises Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (R. 02966–67.)
7

See, e.g., Farrar, 69 A.3d at 1036–37 (“The study that experts from both sides regarded
as more significant was one by Muriel Newhouse and Hilda Thompson in 1965. The
study concerned 76 persons who lived in the vicinity of an asbestos factory in the London
area and who contracted lung disease. Although most (67) of those persons had neither
an occupational nor a household exposure to asbestos but . . . may have been exposed
because they lived in the vicinity of the factory, nine of the subjects were exposed to dust
brought home by a family member and later were diagnosed with mesothelioma or
asbestosis.”); Martin, 561 F.3d at 445 (finding no duty while recognizing “Plaintiff’s
expert report concedes that the first studies of bystander exposure were not published
until 1965.”).
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In Martin, Vernon Martin was allegedly exposed to asbestos from 1951 to 1963
while working for the defendant. His son, Dennis Martin, contracted mesothelioma after
being exposed to the asbestos brought home on the “clothing, hair, and person of his
father.” 2007 WL 2682064 at *1. The court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment because the defendant did not “owe[] a legal duty to [Dennis Martin]
because the potential harm of non-occupational asbestos exposure was not foreseeable to
[the defendant] during the relevant time period.” Id. at *5. “Although the general danger
of prolonged occupational asbestos exposure to asbestos manufacturing workers was
known by at least the mid-1930s, the extension of that harm to others was not widely
known until at least 1972, when OSHA regulations recognized a causal connection.” Id.
(emphasis added). “Simply put, the literature at the time did not place [the defendants]
on notice that bystanders/nonworkers such as [the decedent] were subject to health
maladies due to second-hand exposure to asbestos-containing materials.” Id. (granting
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on no legal duty); see also Martin,
561 F.3d at 444–45 (“We agree with the district court that Martin has failed to show the
risk was foreseeable at the relevant times. . . . Without any published studies or any
evidence of industry knowledge of bystander exposure, there is nothing that would justify
charging [the defendants] with such knowledge during the time that Mr. Martin’s father
was working with asbestos.”).
In Farrar, Jocelyn Farrar was diagnosed with mesothelioma caused by take-home
asbestos exposure from shaking out and laundering her grandfather’s clothes from 1968–
69. 69 A.3d at 1030. The Maryland Court of Appeals determined the harm was not
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foreseeable during the pre-OSHA timeframe of 1968–69, which is even later than the
timeframe here of 1961–66:
Although the danger of exposure to asbestos in the workplace was wellrecognized at least by the 1930s, the danger from exposure in the household
to asbestos dust brought home by workers, though in hindsight perhaps
fairly inferable, was not made publicly clear until much later. . . . The clear
and most widely broadcast breakthrough came in June 1972, when OSHA
adopted regulations dealing specifically with the problem of tracking
asbestos dust on clothing into a home. . . . On the record before us, we
conclude that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding a duty on the
part of [the defendant] to warn Ms. Farrar, back in 1968–69, of the danger
of exposure to the dust on her grandfather’s clothes.
Id. at 1036–39 (emphasis added).
The relevant time period for the take-home exposure in Fourteenth District was
1954 to 1965. 740 N.W.2d at 218. In finding no duty, the court explained that “we did
not know what we know today about the hazards of asbestos” and the plaintiff’s expert
conceded that “the first published literature suggesting a ‘specific attribution to washing
of clothes’ was not published until 1965.” Id. As such, “the risk of ‘take home’ asbestos
exposure was, in all likelihood, not foreseeable by defendant while [the employee] was
working at defendant’s premises from 1954 to 1965.” Id. The court cited a separate
Texas appellate decision, which opinion was replaced on other grounds, stating that “the
risk of ‘take home’ asbestos exposure was not foreseeable to Exxon Mobil before 1972”
because OSHA “did not promulgate regulations prohibiting employers from allowing
workers who had been exposed to asbestos to wear their work clothes home until” then.
Id.
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Just like Martin, “there is nothing that would justify charging [KUC] with”
knowledge of harms resulting from take-home asbestos exposure “during the time that
[Mr. Boynton] was working with asbestos.” 561 F.3d at 444–45. Indeed, “the literature
at the time did not place [KUC] on notice that bystanders/nonworkers such as [Mrs.
Boynton] were subject to health maladies due to second-hand exposure to asbestoscontaining materials.” Martin, 2007 WL 2682064 at *5.
B.

KUC was not in the best position to prevent harm from take-home
asbestos exposure to Mrs. Boynton.

The second “minus” factor does not consider which party has the deepest pockets
but “considers whether the defendant is best situated to take reasonable precautions to
avoid injury.” 2012 UT 11, ¶ 30. This factor “typically” cuts against creating a “duty
where a victim or some other third party is in a superior position of knowledge or control
to avoid the loss in question.” Id. The Court of Appeals of New York analyzed this same
factor in a take-home asbestos exposure case and found that it weighed in favor of no
duty. NYC Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 120. In that case, and similar to here, the
plaintiffs argued that the employer was “in the best position to protect against the risk of
harm” to the employee’s spouse because “it might have compelled [the employee] to
wear clean clothes home from work or to warn [his spouse] about the dangers of washing
his soiled uniforms.” Id. The court disagreed that the employer was in the best position,
reasoning that the employer “was, in fact, entirely dependent upon [the employee]’s
willingness to comply with and carry out such risk-reduction measures.” Id.
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Mr. Boynton, not KUC, was in a “superior position of control” to prevent harm to
Mrs. Boynton from take-home asbestos exposure because he ultimately carried asbestos
fibers home on his clothing and thereby exposed Mrs. Boynton. Even if KUC had
policies requiring the changing or laundering of clothes at the worksite, like NYC
Asbestos, those policies would have been “entirely dependent upon [Mr. Boynton’s]
willingness to comply with and carry out such risk-reduction measures.” Id. Admittedly,
neither KUC nor Mr. Boynton were in great positions to prevent this harm from
occurring—due to not knowing about the potential harm from take-home exposure—but
the question under this factor is whether KUC is best situated to take reasonable
precautions to prevent injury, which it was not. 8
C.

Finding a duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases creates an almost
infinite universe of potential plaintiffs.

“Asbestos claims have given rise to one of the most costly products-liability crises
ever within our nation’s legal system.” Fourteenth Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d at 220. The
pool of traditional asbestos plaintiffs is shrinking, so plaintiff attorneys are trying to
expand the pools of potential plaintiffs and defendants by asserting take-home asbestos
cases against premises owners. However, finding a duty in take-home asbestos exposure
cases would open the flood gates to asbestos litigation in Utah. “[L]iability for takehome exposure would essentially be infinite” because the duty would necessarily be
extended to “children, babysitters, neighbors, dry cleaners, or any other person who
8

KUC is not arguing that Mr. Boynton was in a “superior position of knowledge”
because neither KUC nor Mr. Boynton knew about the risk of take-home asbestos
exposure, but Mr. Boynton was in a “superior position of control.”
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potentially came in contact with [the employee’s] clothes.” Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at
540. 9 But “there is no principled basis in the law upon which to distinguish the claim of a
spouse” with the claim of any other person potentially exposed to an employee’s
asbestos-covered clothing. Riedel, 2007 WL 4571196 at *12.
The burden on a premises owner “to warn or otherwise protect every potentially
foreseeable victim of off-premises exposure to asbestos is simply too great.” Id. Such a
burden—“protecting every person with whom a business’s employees and the employees
of its independent contractors come into contact, or even with who their clothes come
into contact”—is an “extraordinarily onerous and unworkable burden.” Fourteenth Dist.
Court, 740 N.W.2d at 217. For these reasons, the third “minus” factor weighs heavily
against creating a duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases.
IV.

THERE IS NO DISPUTE OF FACT THAT PRECLUDES SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
In denying KUC’s motion for summary judgment, the district court stated there is

a disputed issue of material fact precluding summary judgment:
With respect to [KUC], viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mrs.
Boynton and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in her favor,
affirmative act of specifying and using asbestos pipe insulation and its
employee-insulators’ affirmative acts of exposing Mr. Boynton, a direct
employee of [KUC], raises a disputed issue of material fact as to whether a
legal duty extends to Mrs. Boynton.
9

Williams, 608 S.E.2d at 209 (declining to extend employer’s duty beyond the workplace
to encompass all who might come into contact with an employee or an employee’s
clothing outside the workplace, reasoning that to impose a duty would “expand
traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds and create an almost infinite
universe of potential plaintiffs”); NYC Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 122 (explaining that
the duty line is “not so easy to draw” in take-home asbestos cases); see also In re
Asbestos Litig., 2012 WL 1413887 at *3 (same).
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(R. 05447 (emphasis added).) Notably, the district court did not address whether any of
the “minus” factors would eliminate a duty that otherwise exists, but instead merely
pointed to a supposed dispute of fact involving whether KUC engaged in misfeasance.
The Court should reverse the district court because there are not any disputed
issues of fact that prevent the Court from finding that KUC did not owe a duty to Mrs.
Boynton. The parties agree that Mr. Boynton worked at KUC’s premises from 1961 to
1966. Further, for purposes of summary judgment and this appeal only, it is undisputed
that KUC used asbestos-containing insulation and its workers removed and/or installed
insulation in the vicinity where Mr. Boynton worked. The issue is not whether these
facts are in dispute, but rather, the issue is whether Mr. Boynton contends that KUC was
negligent in performing these acts such that it caused his wife’s harm. As set forth in
detail above, the crux of Mr. Boynton’s claims against KUC concern omissions—failing
to prevent Mr. Boynton from carrying asbestos fibers home on his clothing and failing to
warn him of the potential dangers posed by asbestos exposure—and not active
misfeasance. Finally, whether Mr. Boynton’s allegations constitute affirmative acts or
mere omissions is the threshold issue in the duty analysis and is therefore entirely a
question of law to be determined by a court, not a jury.
The Court should apply the Jeffs factors and hold that KUC did not owe a duty to
Mrs. Boynton.
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CONCLUSION
The district court incorrectly denied KUC’s motion for summary judgment, and
KUC should prevail on appeal because it did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton.
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RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
/s/ Blake M. Biddulph
Rick L. Rose
Kristine M. Larsen
Blake M. Biddulph
Attorneys for Defendant Kennecott Utah
Copper LLC
1503717
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